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1 The integration of rural households into ruminant 
livestock industries in China 
Abstract 
A major determinant of rural development in China is the way by which rural 
households integrate with rural industries. Three forms of integration – market 
integration, vertical integration and integration through local groups – are investigated. 
Policy measures that may facilitate household integration, household specialisation 
and market segmentation are identified. Findings for the ruminant livestock sector are 
widely applicable to other agricultural industries in China.  
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China’s ruminant livestock sector – composed mainly of the beef, mutton, wool, 
cashmere and dairy industries – has recorded double digit annual growth for the last 
two decades, and is expected to continue expanding into the future.
1 This rapid 
growth creates opportunities for rural development. It enables small rural households 
to diversify into new activities, and to grow into larger, more commercially oriented, 
specialised households, or even companies. Many households have also extended 
                                                 
1 For details on Chinese ruminant livestock industries see: Longworth and Williamson (1993), 
Longworth and Brown (1995) and Brown et al. (2005) for wool; Longworth et al. (2001), Brown et al. 
(2002) and Waldron et al. (2003) for beef; and Waldron et al. (2006) for sheep meat.  
2 participation in the ruminant livestock industries into off farm activities such as 
trading and processing.  
 
This sanguine perspective of the implications of the expansion of the ruminant 
livestock sector for rural development has, however, proved elusive for many 
households and areas of China. The vast majority of households in the ruminant 
livestock sector are small, unspecialised and compete in low value markets. Moving 
up the continuum of scale and commercialisation has not been possible or has 
involved unacceptable risks for households. As a result, many ruminant livestock 




A myriad of factors determine rural development outcomes in China,
2 rural 
livelihoods,
3 or smallholder benefits from livestock production.
4 This paper focuses 
on the integration of rural households in rural industries as a major factor in rural 
development. Three inter-related forms of integration are examined: market 
integration; vertical integration; and integration through local groups. The form of 
integration adopted in rural industries, and nature of this integration, is determined by 
the type and value of commodity traded, in combination with institutional and policy 
settings. The way that institutional and policy settings forge industry and rural 
development outcomes are under not widely discussed in either the English- or 
                                                 
2 Aspects of an “enabling” rural development environment including rural-urban migration and land 
contracts are discussed in Nyberg and Rozelle (1999) and Sonntag et al. (ed.) (2005). 
3 Ellis (1999) argues that rural livelihoods are determined by the “three A’s” of assets, activities and 
access, which can be interpreted in terms of the relationships between rural households and their rural 
industries. 
4 Delgado et al. (2003) examine the sometimes ambiguous effects that the “livestock revolution” might 
have on smallholders in developing countries. 
3 Chinese-language literature on the Chinese agricultural economy, or by Chinese 
policy makers. While necessarily broad, this paper aims to contribute to such a debate.   
2. Market Integration 
The ruminant livestock sector has undergone far reaching reform over the last two 
decades. Subsidies for marketing agencies, compulsory procurement, stockpiling, and 
price controls now play insignificant roles in the sector. While supply chains can be 
diverse, ruminant livestock industries are totally dominated by a plethora of individual 
households. As a defining feature of market integration, the vast majority of market 
transactions are made between these households through private treaty, as spot 
transactions.   
 
More specifically, livestock raising households are free to choose their activities and 
respond to market (as well as administrative) signals. These household producers sell 
livestock or livestock products on farm or in local markets through private treaty. 
They sell predominantly to household traders, who on-sell for product transformation 
(e.g. feedlots, slaughter households or scours) or into a hierarchy of larger and more 
distant traders. In these marketing chains, most meat is destined for wet markets and 
most fibre for the lower value processing. Thus, these open Chinese marketing 
networks are highly deregulated, decentralised and fragmented.  
 
While ruminant livestock markets can be reasonably well spatially integrated,
 5 they 
function imperfectly, especially in terms of product differentiation, and market 
segmentation. The vast majority of product traded on open markets is low value and 
generic in nature. A contributing reason is that marketing chains do not adequately 
                                                 
5 See Brown (2002) and Rozelle (1997). 
4 reflect the price-grade differentials that downstream customers and final consumers 
are prepared to accept. For example, many wool textile mills are prepared to pay 
significant premiums for higher quality wool. However, wool producing households 
sell their wool to traders on a mixed grade, average price basis.
6 For meat, many 
consumers are prepared to pay premiums for specific cuts or characteristics of meat, 
or safety and quality assured product. However, livestock raising households sell to 
traders solely on the basis of volume (liveweight and estimated dressing percentage).
7
 
Broad and sometimes inaccurate product description and subjective measurement 
means that customers or consumers are uncertain about exactly what they are buying. 
They therefore seek to minimize purchase risks by paying relatively low prices. The 
low prices flow back, through traders, to household producers. In addition, ruminant 
livestock prices also fluctuate widely (Lin, 1997).
8  
 
This form of marketing system is also more likely to engender opportunistic 
behaviour, especially from traders. Traders have incentives to purchase from 
household producers on a mixed grade, average price basis, sort the commodity (even 
if crudely) and on-sell the produce without passing price-grade premiums back to 
households. This is possible because traders are much more aware of the preferences 
of downstream customers and consumers than are household producers (information 
asymmetries). Households incur significant transaction costs in seeking alternative 
means of price discovery for different grades of products. For example, households 
                                                 
6 After purchasing crudely sorted wool from traders, mills resort wool into industrial grades. 
7 Stalls at some wet markets butcher meat into cuts with differential prices. At the opposite end of the 
spectrum, meat can be sold in lumps where customers can not recognise the species (e.g. sheep or goat 
meat) or cuts, and is subject to practices such as the injecting of water. 
8 In Chinese terms, the market is often described as chaotic (luan) or unstandardised (buguifan). Severe 
price fluctuations suggest that market signals are not clearly expressed, but are also related to shifts in 
supply through government programs. 
5 often take cattle to local markets three times before a transaction takes place – and 
incur even higher search costs in more distant markets. In addition, households are 
attracted to on the spot payments without delays caused by grading and measurement.   
 
This prevailing market environment for ruminant livestock products has major 
implications for household producers. In particular, it creates an inertia whereby 
rational households have incentives to raise generic types of livestock or livestock 
products for mass markets, and thereby remain as small, unspecialised households 
working on low or negative returns.
9 The costs of specialisation, expanding 
production and targeting higher value markets can often not be recouped through 
higher farm gate prices, and hence represent an unacceptable risk.  
 
In response, government at all levels have encouraged household specialisation 
through policy measures on the production side. Measures include the subsidisation of 
household facilities (for example livestock pens and straw ammoniation pits), 
extension inputs (especially breeding and genetics), credit, and training. As discussed 
below, the households are often linked up with enterprises or organised into local 
groups. However, little effort is made to target the production of specific products to 
specific markets through appropriate marketing channels. This, in large part, is 
because the government institution responsible for the livestock sector and with direct 
contact with households – the Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Bureau – is a 
production oriented institution. Various other institutions also construct “hard” 
infrastructure such as physical market places and fences.     
 
                                                 
9 In semi-subsistent systems, calculation of household returns are determined largely by the treatment 
of major cost items such as feed and labour (see Longworth et al., 2001, Chapter 5).    
6 However, far less emphasis is placed in the delivery of “soft” (or intangible) market 
services that underpin a well functioning market economy. The absence or 
underdevelopment of these services contributes to the lack of product differentiation 
and opportunistic behaviour in the ruminant livestock sector. In particular: 
•  The price reporting system is not disaggregated enough to provide useful 
commercial information for traders or producers.  
•  There are no grading systems for meat, while the grading systems for wool and 
cashmere are barely used in domestic trading.  
•  There are no mechanisms for processors to systematically feed back information 
to traders or household producers (from, for example, carcass inspection results 
or wool grading, testing or processing results).   
•  There are several schemes that are applied to products that meet defined 
standards for areas such as production inputs, disease, and hygiene. However, 
these standards schemes are only used in vertically integrated, enterprise-led 
chains. Products traded by households on the open market are not incorporated in 
these schemes. Rather they are subject to public regulations, which are only 
partially applied and monitored.   
•  There is little or no monitoring of market conduct at nongmao or wet markets, 
and there is little or no registration or regulation of traders. 
•  The lack of accurate product description entails difficulties in dispute resolution 
or contract laws.   
 
Several reasons explain the lack of development of market services in China. Perhaps 
most importantly, the benefits of providing such services in low value markets are 
unlikely to exceed the substantial costs involved. At the same time, publicly provided 
7 market services are unlikely to be justified in high value markets, where enterprises 
seek to differentiate products through their own forms of quality assurance, and where 
information is generated within the vertically integrated structures. Finally, China has 
not yet developed the institutional structures that might be able to deliver these 
services (including the capacity to collect revenues from users of the services).    
  
While the expansion of market services may be uneconomic in low and high value 
market segments, it may be warranted in the burgeoning mid value market segments. 
Mid value market segments pose realistic technical demands on the industry, and the 
supply chains to service these markets are inclusive of household actors, especially 
specialised household producers and small traders. It may be possible to attract 
funding (e.g. levies) from these actors to fund the programs. However, there may also 
be a public good argument for the public delivery of such services, especially given 
their potential role in promoting inclusive rural development. Public support for the 
improvement of marketing services is an alternative to the prevailing policy focus on 
production aspects of the sector.  
      
3. Vertical integration 
 
Market integration is distinguishable from vertical integration where transactions are 
internalised within more formalised hierarchies. Several theories explain the existence 
of vertical integration. Theories from neo-classical economics revolve around market 
imperfections (such as uncertainty, economies of scale, market power and free riding). 
Theories from institutional economics focus on transaction costs, including 
incomplete contracts and relationship specific investment (Joskow, 2005). It has long 
8 been recognised that under conditions of high transaction costs on open markets, 
firms seek to internalise costs within vertically integrated structures (Coase, 1937). 
Shorter and more formalised supply chains may also increase capacity to provide 
continuity and quality of supply.   
 
China’s highly imperfect market system acts as one of the reasons for the rapid rise of 
vertical integration in Chinese agriculture. Ministry of Agriculture surveys reported in 
Niu (2002), estimated that in 2000, around 25% of China’s farmers were “vertically 
integrated” – widely defined to include household relationships with enterprises, local 
groups, and specialised physical market places. However, the most common form of 
vertical integration is contractual relations between specialised households and 
enterprises. In Chinese terms, households are led (daidong) by dragon head 
enterprises (longtou qiye) into marketing chains (the length of the dragon – 
yitiaolong). This form of integration is especially pronounced in high value markets in 
Chinese ruminant livestock sector.  
 
Vertical integration provides an important means for households to specialise, access 
higher value and export markets, and to increase incomes.
10 Contracts usually 
stipulate input (including breeding, feed and veterinary) regimes and output 
specifications, which are linked to price premiums. That is, price-grade differentials 
are established at household level. Another incentive for households to enter into 
vertically integrated structures is that various forms of official and enterprise support 
are often attached, including the provision of infrastructure, extension services, 
training and credit.  
                                                 
10 Niu (2002) reports that vertically integrated households have significantly higher (Rmb900) incomes 
than those not vertically integrated. 
9  
Despite the potential of the vertical integration model for rural and industry 
development, it has not proceeded without problems. Enterprises complain that 
households readily renege on contracts if they are able to get (even marginally) higher 
prices on the open market, especially if cash is offered on the spot.
11 Households 
complain that terms of the contracts can be changed by enterprises, especially when 
they diverge from market prices and developments. Legal structures to resolve 
contract disputes can be weak at local levels.  
 
As a result of such problems, a shift is taking place from formal contracts to more 
informal relationships between parties.
12 These more flexible and loose arrangements 
closely resemble market integration as described in Section 2 above. Local officials 
say that they are pleased to see the competition between vertically integrated 
structures (that they have helped to create) and the “normal” market, if it means 
higher prices for household producers.   
 
A more significant structural problem with the vertical integration program is the way 
that it is managed at local levels. In particular, dragon head enterprises are commonly 
promoted and subsidised as the main organisational structure to lead the vertical 
integration process and to target higher value markets. This is often done from a 
production led perspective, without sales channels in place. Unviable enterprises and 
ill conceived marketing can have disastrous consequences for households that invest 
                                                 
11 Households can wait significant periods of time for payment after delivery of product through 
vertically integrated structures. In the case of fine wool, the households are paid on the basis of test 
results and auction prices, while payment for high-value livestock can be made after slaughter on the 
basis of carcass measurements. 
12 For example, an abattoir or fibre marketing agency will inform an intensive livestock production area 
(township or village) of its requirements, and buy from the area when the product is ready.   
10 and specialise to integrate with the structures, which they are encouraged to do by 
local administrative and extension systems.   
 
The strong government support afforded to the vertical integration program also raises 
a range of broader social questions. Scarce local resources diverted into the vertical 
integration program could otherwise be used for local activities that affect a wider 
number of households, or for poverty alleviation schemes targeted directly at poor 
households. It can also be argued that services with a strong public good component – 
such as market services and extension – are under resourced because there is an 
expectation that these will be provided by or through enterprises and vertically 
integrated structures. For example, grading, food safety and export standards are 
applied through enterprises, rather than as public goods accessible to a wide range of 
actors. In this case, it may be that a gap between vertically integrated, specialised 
households (on the one hand) and market integrated, unspecialised households (on the 
other) will grow in a “dual development” scenario. The emphasis on larger scale 
actors (such as feedlots) may also crowd out smaller households producing the same 
sort of livestock.      
4. Local group structures 
Another way for households to integrate with their industries is through participation 
in the many and varied forms of local groups, including associations, co-operatives, 
“small livestock raising areas”, or specialised townships and villages. These local 
groups act as an intermediary organisation to facilitate the entry of households into 
industries. They help in assembling the products of many small households into larger 
lines or lots of homogeneous product required to service higher value markets. 
Economies of scale and consistent practices also apply to production inputs and 
11 services, and to programs such as disease control. Links with local groups is almost a 
requisite for the establishment vertically integrated structures. Local groups also 
increase the bargaining power of participants, including vis-à-vis enterprises. Market 
integrated households sometimes operate in clusters (specialised villages) to build 
economies of scale and scope (for example into slaughter, cold storage and trading).          
 
Shen et al. (2004) estimate that in 2003 only about 3% of households in China were 
members of “Farmer Professional Associations”, which are a relatively tightly defined 
form of local group. Livestock was the most highly represented sector, within which 
(beef and dairy) cattle and (meat and wool) sheep were amongst the most highly 
represented industries in proportion to their size.  
 
However, much higher proportions of households are involved in other forms of local 
groups that are specialised in particular industry activities. For example, some 
counties and cities in the Central Plains of China have hundreds of villages 
specialised in beef cattle production – defined in terms of per capita cattle numbers, 
but also involving co-ordination in inputs and marketing. A more formal form of 
organisation known as “livestock small areas” (yangzhi xiaoqu) have grown in 
importance across China. In Chifeng Prefecture in Inner Mongolia in 2003, more than 
30% of all livestock are raised in small areas (including 200 sheep producing “small 
areas” comprised of more than 6000 specialised households) and there are plans to 
increase this number to 70% by 2008.      
 
Problems also arise in the development of local groups. First, even with a broad 
interpretation of “local groups” to incorporate informal, intensive production areas 
12 within administrative borders, they are under represented in Chinese agriculture, 
particularly when compared with other countries such as Japan and South Korea at 
comparative levels of development. Second, local groups are often initiated by higher 
levels of government – often in co-ordination with enterprises – while local leaders 
play a major role in the ongoing functioning of the groups. That is, local groups are 
easily captured within (profit oriented) corporatist structures. Third, few of the local 
industry groups are run on genuine co-operative principles, in a bottom-up fashion. 
 
There are various reasons for the under development of the local group structures in 
China. It is often claimed that households are reluctant to enter into co-operative 
activities because they are associated with the excesses of the collective era. However, 
high level institutional structures do not help the situation. The Party-State 
discourages structures that facilitate the organisation and representation of rural 
groups. In 2005, a Co-operative Law had been drafted and its’ passing into law may 
help to clarify the legal status of local groups. In particular, it should enable groups to 
register as a genuine co-operative, enter into contracts as legal entities, and take out 
loans – all of which are not possible at present.  
5. Conclusions 
The diversification of China’s rural economy – through the development of multiple 
forms of rural households, that integrate into multiple forms of marketing channels, 
and that service multiple value market segments – bodes well for industry and rural 
development prospects. However, as discussed in this paper, some institutional 
arrangements and policy settings constrain and bias the process. In some cases, these 
constraints can be minimised by reducing emphasis on production-push policy 
measures to promote industry and rural development. At the same time, there are 
13 areas where more government involvement is required in the delivery of public goods. 
An improved appreciation of the way that rural households integrate with rural 
industries may help in the development of these institutional and policy settings.  
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